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Introduction

Postphenomenology
Adapted from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of phenomenology, which explores the structure of human experience between the world and a sensing body, Don Ihde's postphenomenology considers relationships between bodies and technologies, and how technologies change bodily experiences. This is an area of research that can be traced back as early as 1877, when Ernst Kapp's Grundlinien Einer Philosophie Der Tecknik (Philosophy of Technology) (Kapp, 1877) was published. Within that work, Kapp traces the evolution of tools, which as he argues, developed from the appearance and functionality of the human body. As Kapp states, humans have limited capacities in terms of vision, muscular strength or storable information, and consequentially overcame such limitations through tools, which should be considered as replacements for human organs, rather than an extension or supplement (Brey, 2000) . As Kapp argues, tools were intended to replace human organs, and as such, were designed on human organ functionality. 'The bent finger becomes a hook, the hollow of the hand a bowl' (Mitcham, 1994, p.24) , while various technologies from swords, oars, rakes or spades evoke the positions of human arms, hands and fingers (Mitcham, 1994, p.24) . As Pasi Väliaho writes, this is what Kapp refers to as organ projections, 'in which our corporeal apparatus, the inside, becomes exteriorized in technical objects ' (Väliaho, 2010, p. 80) . Following Kapp, Väliaho explains how 'the eye [is] an organ modulated through its projection in the camera obscura, whereas the nervous system is recreated through its projection in the electro-magnetic telegraph' (Väliaho, 2010, p. 80) . These technological projections of the body are established from 'the Greek word organon, which means both a part of the body and a tool' (Väliaho, 2010, p. 80 ).
Many have closely followed this line of inquiry; Peter Sloterdijk argued that, 'humans have already been strongly shaped by technology' (Koops et al., 2013, p. 97 
How Does Technology Extend and Limit a User?
The influence of technology upon a user can be considered using MerleauPonty's well-known example of how a blind man's cane becomes an extension of touch, providing 'a parallel to sight ' (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 165) . As Ihde asserts, such an extension is always balanced by a synchronous reduction. The cane user can feel the textured hardness of the pavement through the cane technology but cannot experience its greyness of colour (Ihde, 2002, p. 7) .
Neither can the user feel the sensation of the pavement's warmth or coldness through the cane. The tool therefore filters certain phenomenological sensations while enhancing others. This specific relationship between bodies and tools is something that Ihde considers in all human-technology relationships. The telephone for example is a common tool that simultaneously reduces human-tohuman contact as it filters visual, haptic and olfactory sensations to just an abstract voice. But this reduction is balanced with a sense of amplification as the tool extends the voice across any geographical distance, allowing two people miles apart to conduct a fluent conversation in real time. According to Ihde (Ihde, 1990, p. 76) , the concept of amplification/reduction is evident in all technological mediations, especially embodiment relationships, where a technology will 'withdraw' into its user during use, allowing its user to act or see through the embodied device. This is what Ihde and Andy Clark refer to as 'transparency' to consider how a technology becomes incorporated with an organic host, enabling new opportunities and methods of acting and thinking upon a world. As Clark highlights, the term transparency originates from Heidegger's hypothesis of 'transparent equipment' (Clark, 2010, p. 10) , a term meaning to see through such equipment to a particular job at hand. A pen for example (as Clark notes) is not the focus of a writer's attention (Clark, 2004, p. 38) but is rather a biological dovetailing technology (Clark, 2004, p. 28 ) that the user acts through and is extended by as the pen withdraws into the bodily grip and movement of its user.
However if the pen should run out of ink, an awareness of the technology is perceptibly bought to light. This is an example of Heidegger's concept of 'readyto-hand' and 'present-at-hand' (Heidegger et al., 2010 
Ihde's Human-Body Relationships
Ihde's human-body relationships consist of: embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity and background relationships (see Figures 1-4) . Embodiment (Fig. 1) denotes a perception or experience through a technology as a tool synthesises with a body in a particular way. The embodied connection is constituted through the cane, eyeglasses, writing utensils, or any other type of technology that is positioned between body and world, providing the body with some form of technological extension where we act or perceive through the artefact. In this paper, this includes a bicycle (The Legible City) and motion sensing environments (Scenario). A hermeneutical relationship (Fig. 2) , in contrast to the embodiment relationship of seeing through a technology, is an experience of a technology. Hermeneutic therefore pertains to a technology that we read, such as screens, clocks, thermometers, maps, books, or any other tool that marks a separation between a body and a technology. An alterity relationship (Fig. 3) , unlike the first two examples, is a case in which a technology (from the perspective of the human) seemingly takes on a life of its own. Artificial intelligence for instance, would be a contemporary example of this. A more traditional one might be (from a human perspective) the erratic path a spinning top toy might travel. Finally background relationships (Fig. 4) What is a Body?
As stated above, this paper adopts Ihde's reasoning as to what a body is.
According to Ihde, a body is something that is simultaneously solid and virtual, motile and cultural (Ihde, 2002, p. xi) . His understanding of a body is divided between the breathing, sensing, perceptual and emotive being-in-the-world, or biological body that he calls body one. This is juxtaposed with body two, which denotes a culturally constructed representation of body; such as the messages we give out to others by the way we dress our bodies, comport ourselves and behave in society. By way of an example, Andrew Feenberg (writing about Ihde) notes how the blind man's cane 'does more than sense the world; it also reveals [to others] the man as blind' (Selinger, 2012, p. 191 
The non-neutrality of technology
In Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth, Ihde asserts that technologies are not neutral (Ihde, 1990, p. 141 (Ihde, 1990, p. 141) . These intentionalities, as
Peter-Paul Verbeek explains, 'play an active role in the relationship between humans and their world' (Verbeek, 2006) . Verbeek goes on to note how 'these intentionalities are not fixed properties of artifacts' (Verbeek, 2006) but rather 'get shape within the relationship humans have with these artifacts' (Verbeek, 2006) . In doing so, technologies change naked human-world relationships.
Through this understanding, intentions, beliefs, desires and meanings obtain their shape by the technologies that occupy the in-between fields. To illustrate
Ihde's preliminary concepts, he argues that naked unmediated relationships break down thus:
Human World
In phenomenology the human can be thought of as an experiencer, and the world an environment that is experienced. The arrow stands for the direction of focus or intentionality (in Edmund Husserl's sense of the term) 2 directed towards the world of something, which in this instance will be the world of interactive art. As
Ihde explains, directed actional involvement with a world is not only onedirectional, however, it is also reflexive or interactive.
Phenomenology interprets intentionality as not only a distance from and involvement with world, but as reflexive with respect to world. This is to say […] what we eventually come to know of ourselves is strictly reciprocal with what we come to know of the world. Without world there would be no self; without self, no experience of the world (Ihde, 1983, p. 53) .
In other words, the world reflects experience or knowledge back onto the human. The world of fire for example is hot and dangerous, the human learns from experience not to put a hand directly into it. For someone to burn him or herself with fire is to take that world of fire back into one's self-experiencing. A second arrow denotes this accordingly:
Once we begin to consider the role that technologies play in mediating between humans and world, the relationship changes once more:
Human Technology World
According to Ihde, building upon Heidegger's philosophy of technology, when the world of something is mediated through a technological means, the medium alters that which is experienced both outwardly of world and reflexively of self (Ihde, 1983, p. 53-55) . It is through this arrangement that I will be considering the worlds of interactive artworks, particularly how the experience of these artworks are mediated through technological interfaces and how these interfaces reflexively organise the body of the user. This is similar to how the telephone reduces the speaking subject to just a voice, while amplifying and extending the subject to instantaneously reach a geographically remote recipient.
Ihde's concept of amplification/reduction is how he asserts that technology is non-neutral, as devices such as Shaw's bike filter and mediate experiences. This is not to say that Ihde is a technological determinist. As Carl
Mitcham acknowledges, Ihde 'rejects a hard technological determinism' but admits how technologies are often 'latent telic inclinations' (Mitcham, 1994, p. 77 ). This 'predispose[s] human beings to develop certain life forms over others' (Mitcham, 1994, p. 77 (Ihde, 1990, p. 76) . In The Legible City, the bike is the technology that the rider embodies and perceives through in order to co-create an experience. As with all embodiment relationships, transparency of a technology is never pure, as its presence makes itself known through the amplification/reduction structure. This is something that I came to appreciate at the ZKM Karlsruhe, when I first experienced The Legible City. I soon became aware that the physical effort of cycling in the real world was being virtually transcribed before me upon a screen that corresponded to the pedaling and steering actions that I performed. Gestures from my body were being amplified from the realm of the real into the world of the virtual. This is an example of what Anna Munster talks about when she describes how 'our bodies, analog compositions that they are, can […] transform themselves and become virtual selves' (Munster, 2006, p. 114) . For Munster 'analog/digital relations are interdependent rather than separate' (Munster, 2006, p. 114 ) allowing a trajectory or flux to extend beyond our bounded bodies into a virtual other. This is a concept shared by many; N. Katherine Hayles' analysis on the posthuman has argued that informational patterns such as email are a way that 'problematizes thinking of the body as a self-evident physicality' (Hayles, 1999, p. 27 Munster claims that virtualization is 'an expanding and contracting field of differentiation, an enfolding of matter by informational incorporeality' (Munster, 2006, p. 114) . This is a concept that overlaps with Ihde's and can be applied to The Legible City, as the installation simultaneously expands and contracts the rider's corporeal techniques and bodily awareness amid an aura of informational code. As the rider pedals the bike, muscular effort is churned into informational code, with its effect presented before him or her upon the screen.
As I discovered during my experience an increase in leg speed propels the visual rapidity of letters and a physical decrease slows them down. But I also found that, as much as the cyclist is projected into the virtual world and in a sense extended by the technology of the interface, he or she is also inhibited by it. As previously explained, my bodily movement was constrained only to pedaling and steering, decreasing a range of possible bodily actions to just these two. This experience of amplification/reduction was also transcribed into the lettered world before me. Letters took on amplified significance in this artwork as alphabetical symbols, map markings, buildings and images. The method of reading became amplified in this artwork, expanded from the cognitive practice that is bounded by the rules of scanning a page from left to right, top to bottom.
Instead I could travel in any direction, co-creating new meanings as I went, or even traveling through letters themselves. In doing so, however, the sentences became more abstract and the meaning reduced. It also became evident that in order to read the words within this virtual world, I had to slow my pedaling down so that I could take the words in, thus amplifying my cognitive understanding through corporeal reduction. 
The co-authoring interface of Scenario
Dennis Del Favero's Scenario is a digital interactive artwork that enables its users to interface with imagery in an immersive story setting. Originally
Scenario was intended as a way to test the formation of meaningful relationships between humans and technology by generating 'innovative research in the field of machine learning and artificial intelligence (Favero and Barker, 2010 (Brown et al., 2011) .
When users first enter the space, they are met with the slow notes of a piano composition followed by the sound of an eerie voice. The voice welcomes the participants to come forth, and as they do, their movement triggers the imagery of large floating disembodied eyes, portrayed upon the circular panoramic screen. The voice instructs the users to choose an eye, which the participants do by moving towards one (if the user does not comply an eye will choose them). Following this, a light-coloured digital humanoid figure mounts the top of each eye and leads the user through a 3D labyrinth of atmospheric locales. This journey begins with the sound and imagery of falling rain as participants are led through shadowy passageways that appear to move as if they (the user) are traversing the space. Occasionally the humanoid guide stops in their tracks to pick something up, showing it to their human followers. These exhibited objects are smooth bloodless body parts that appear to have once belonged to another humanoid character before something or someone fragmented it. Here the users are supposed to encounter a sense of mystery, atrocity and criminality. This is assisted by the dark ambient tones of these strange backdrops, designed to coerce a sense of uncanniness and foreboding in each participant's body. This is heightened, as Del Favero and Barker (2010) explain, by the way users experience 'the ambiguity of the sensory objects that succeed by outsmarting the machine, the child comes to life and walks through the surrounding forest as snow begins to fall, a symbolisation of renewal (Barker, 2012a) .
As Edward Scheer has identified in his analysis of Scenario, the broken child is pivotal to the artwork through its symbolic evocation of Jacque Lacan's concept of the fragmented body (Scheer and Sewell, 2011) . In Lacanian psychoanalysis the development of a child's ego in the mirror stage, in which the child perceives itself as a whole for the first time and begins to forge an identity, is fuelled by the desire to escape its previous and vulnerable existence as an assemblage of fragmented limbs. As Scheer identifies by way of Malcolm Bowie's writings on Lacan, 'the body once seemed dismembered, all over the place, and the anxiety associated with this memory fuels the individual's desire to be the possessor and the resident of a secure bodily 'I'' (Bowie, 1993, p. 26) . The restoration of the infant's body is therefore more than just a game but is rather a story of what it means to be a body. In an interview I conducted with Del Favero he elaborated on this:
a baby goes through a process of having to put itself together.
To become a person you have to be able to articulate not only your intention to move your arm but actually recognise that your arm is attached to your body. To do that requires an Del Favero's description is indicative of Hansen's portrayal of body-brain activity in VR environments in the sense that there is a dynamic coupling between body and image, where the body transforms the medium as the medium transforms the body (Hansen, 2004, p. 186) . Del Favero's exposition is also symptomatic of body ecology in terms of how parts connect to and relate to one another, and how in Brian Massumi's sense of affect, bodily movement always fills an incorporeal space of potentiality. Massumi (2002) describes affect as a virtual co-presence of potentiality that is integrated into humans as bodily beings. He asserts that, 'the body is as immediately abstract as it is concrete; its activity and expressivity extend, as on their underside, into an incorporeal, yet perfectly real, dimension of pressing potential' (Massumi, 2002, p. 31) . In other words, affect is a virtual threshold of potentiality that a physical body converges with. Affect can therefore be considered a virtual, incorporeal space for potential action and incorporeal possibility, such as the multitude of actions a human body is capable of. As Massumi states, [w] hat is being termed affect […] is precisely this two-sidedness, the simultaneous participation of the virtual in the actual and the actual in the virtual, as one arises from and returns to the other. Affect is this two-sidedness as seen from the side of the actual thing.
[…] Affects are virtual synesthetic perspectives anchored in (functionally limited by) the actually existing, particular things that embody them. The autonomy of affect is its participation in the virtual.
[…] Affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is (Massumi, 2002, p. 35 ).
Consequently, a body is put together with every move it makes in a process of continuous becoming. This interaction is what defines the co-evolutionary narrative of Scenario, which can be considered a conversation between human and computer. As Andrew Stern states, '[b]y making the computer listen to the audience (the first half of reactivity), think about what it heard (autonomy), and then speak its thoughts back to the audience (the second half of reactivity), the artwork can have a dialogue, a conversation with the audience' (Stern, 2001 ).
This conversation of Scenario between the digital characters and the human users relies upon embodiment, hermeneutic and alterity relationships through the way that the iTRACK system detects motion, translates it into digital data and responds accordingly. By taking Ihde's technology relationships into consideration, this interaction breaks down even further. In terms of an amplification/reduction structure, Scenario sets out a specific relationship for the user, whereupon his or her corporeality is detected and reduced into code, 3 then instantly projected into the circular screen, amplifying the user's body into a parallel form of self. This parallel body becomes the means to experience a parallel narrative of the child who will either live or die based upon how users perform, once tethered (in a virtual capacity) to their avatars.
In addition to embodiment (through motion sensing) and the hermeneutic relationship of reading the screen, the postphenomenological experience of Scenario also incorporates an alterity and background relationship.
Aside from the background of the AVIE which conditions the user's space and how they move in it, along with the background of the iTRACK system as it communicates body motion with the programming of the digital characters, the experience of the artwork is also one of alterity, that is of sharing a space with something anterior to the self, or trying to come to terms in a shared space with the other. Ihde describes alterity as a relationship in which the human user encounters a form of otherness, which is seemingly independent and autonomous. This is the difference, as Ihde argues, between driving a car and riding a spirited horse. The first responds to your commands and is embodied while the latter has a life of its own that is unpredictable. Both modes of transport put the driver and rider in an embodiment relationship where they experience the road through the car or horse. But whereas a car malfunction indicates a mechanical lack of response in the vehicle, a lack of response in a spirited horse exceeds malfunction as disobedience (Ihde, 1990, p. 99) .
Computer games are another example of alterity, in which the player is pitted against the autonomy of a virtual character or scenario that they must outperform. Through alterity play there is, as Ihde states, 'the sense of interacting with something other than me, the technological competitor. In competition there is a kind of dialogue or exchange. It is the quasi-animation, the quasi-otherness of the technology that fascinates and challenges. I must beat the machine or it will beat me' (Ihde, 1990, p. 100-01) .
This is the form that Scenario takes as the dark characters achieve The desire to save the child during the restorative process serves as a reminder of the performing role of the caring parent or nurturing adult, which as Del Favero commented, is an intrinsically primal and human response to a child in distress (Del Favero interview, 2014) . If a user goes above and beyond to save this child from anguish, or alternatively is indifferent to the whole affair, these conscious or unconscious feelings are presented physically within the space, revealed through the user's bodily endeavours.
Later in our interview, Del Favero discussed how the idea of concealed desire and the conflation of unconsciousness buried within the conscious subject is thematised within the structure of this work, which is also inspired by the What this suggests is that the non-neutrality of technology can also be used as a way to devise or study the content of interactive structures through the changeability and arrangement of these human-technology relationships.
Furthermore, embodiment relationships (the main ingredient present within both of these artworks) can be subdivided even further into the amplification/reduction structure. Movement and gesture in the third act of Scenario works by users being amplified into the imagery through an avatar that extends movement through motion sensors. At the exact moment of these motion sensors extending corporeality, they also reduce it, represented through the adversaries of the dark sentinel characters that attempt to block a user's mobility and gesticulation. Ihde's concept of amplification/reduction is therefore revealed in the technology of the artwork. The structure between dark and light characters is again emblematic of the user's body within the interface, as movement is both physically reduced in terms of natural rhythm (observed by Barker and Del Favero) and reduced to code in order for users to be amplified as a parallel form of self, present both inside and outside of the screen as a performer and spectator of the content.
In this sense content mirrors form, particularly when we consider how the notion of amplification/reduction is pivotal to an interactive structure, because it helps to establish a corporeal/incorporeal or actual/virtual dichotomy that each of these works are predicated upon. Solid bodies and the incorporeal space of potentiality that they slide into are what these artwork interfaces set up, thus enabling the content to become interactive, giving the user the ability to choose a particular path to cycle through in The Legible City, or to rescue or neglect the child in Scenario, which in turn leads to different outcomes.
Ihde's postphenomenological framework thus enables us to see how tools extend and reduce the human body, as apparatuses get under our skin, and affect both the user and an event through specific human-technology relationships.
Through the interactivity of these relationships, particularly the embodiment relationship, users become simultaneously extended and reduced in a postphenomenological way, a way that temporarily changes a user through a tool to enact a postphenomenological performance.
